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ABSTRACT 
 
 
POSTHUMAN TIME BEINGS 
BY KUHELIKA GHOSH 
 
This thesis examines the potential ethics and politics of the cosmopolitan subject in a 
posthuman world in Ruth Ozeki’s A Tale for the Time Being. Cosmopolitanism refers to the idea 
that all human beings live in a global community and are citizens of the world. Although 
cosmopolitanism initially emerged as a humanist idea with its ethics and politics lying only 
within the realm of the human, the novel moves beyond this anthropocentric approach due to its 
setting in the Anthropocene. I assert that Tale showcases a posthuman turn in the literary 
narrative by depicting environmental agency in the processes of literary production and 
circulation within the novel. With this posthuman turn, there is also a posthuman shift in the 
epistemological framework of the novel as it refers to the cosmopolitan subject as a “time 
being,” including both the human and the nonhuman within it. However, I contend that this 
temporal mode of cosmopolitanism diminishes the ethics and politics of the cosmopolitan subject 
due to the ontological challenges to reality that come up with the distortion of literary time. 
Instead, I suggest that Tale turns toward literary and environmental affect to grapple with the 
dilemma of posthuman cosmopolitanism and to materialize the cosmopolitan connection, while 
also maintaining an affective ethics and politics that transcends the human figure.  
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Introduction 
The diary of sixteen-year-old Nao floats across the Pacific Ocean from Japan and reaches 
the shores of an island in the Pacific Northwest where the character Ruth comes across it. 
Although the two characters occupy vastly different corners of the world, they find solace in 
each other’s cosmopolitan backgrounds. However, Nao does not call herself a cosmopolitan; she 
says she is a “time being,” or “someone who lives in time, and that means you, and me, and 
every one of us who is, or was, or ever will be” (Ozeki 1). The “time being” includes not just the 
human, but trees, waves, crows, mountains, technology, and anything ever to exist in time. Nao 
believes that everything on earth is a time being, therefore reducing the human figure’s 
significance in the world. Ruth Ozeki’s A Tale for the Time Being (2013) features a posthuman 
world, or a world where the human is submerged in the natural environment. However, these 
shifting ontological and epistemological frameworks in Tale create tremendous anxiety for the 
cosmopolitan characters in the novel, Ruth and Nao. By calling herself a “time being”, Nao 
situates the cosmopolitan subject within the bounds of time but not space or body, and broadens 
the notion of normative cosmopolitanism to include both the human and the nonhuman. 
However, the cosmopolitan subject often feels lost and isolated in this newly posthuman world 
located within temporality, which calls into question the ethics and politics of cosmopolitanism. 
A cosmopolitan human being is one who believes in the shared nature of humanity, and 
sees the world as their home. In the fourth century BC, the Greek philosopher Diogenes refused 
to identify with the Athenians or the Greeks and declared himself a citizen of the world instead 
(Piering). However, cosmopolitanism has always been a humanist notion, based on human ideas 
of citizenship in nation-states. Similarly, humanism came to be dominant in the seventeenth 
century when René Descartes created a binary between the human and the nonhuman, 
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proclaiming that reason makes humans human. Humanism and cosmopolitanism initially went 
hand in hand because the human figure was associated with the ethical and political qualities of 
reason and citizenship, which were not seen to exist in the territory of the nonhuman. However, 
the dominance of the human in the world becomes questionable as we enter the Anthropocene, 
“the historical moment when the Human has become a geological force capable of affecting all 
life on this planet,” through climate change and extinctions (Braidotti, The Posthuman 5). In the 
Anthropocene, the human’s negative power over material elements makes it necessary to 
reconsider the repercussions of a humanist approach and move away from it. Thus, 
posthumanism in today’s age is about “the possibility of a serious de-centering of ‘Man’, the 
former measure of all things” (2).1 In the age of the Anthropocene, the cosmopolitan subject 
feels lost and isolated in an already changing world. Since the human figure is so central to the 
cosmopolitan project, the Anthropocene threatens humanist cosmopolitanism by shattering the 
notion of the supreme human being. Instead, it leads to a move toward posthuman 
cosmopolitanism that engenders a new kind of ethics and politics in the cosmopolitan realm that 
                                                 
1 So, what does posthumanist discourse look like today? Posthumanism is used to refer to 
a wide variety of movements that have developed in opposition to traditional humanism 
including philosophical, cultural, and critical posthumanism; transhumanism; new materialisms; 
antihumanism and metahumanism (Ferrando 26). While antihumanism believes in the symbolic 
death of man, transhumanism looks at the enhancement of humans through technology and 
science (31; 27). However, my thesis is interested in critical posthumanism, or the idea of 
moving away from a human-centric world, which I shall expand upon later on. 
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transcends the human figure. Thus, this decentering of the human in the world leads to the 
environment and matter gaining prominence within epistemological representation. 
But what does the Anthropocene look like today and why is a posthuman perspective 
even important? The Anthropocene features two opposing viewpoints. On the one hand, it sees 
the human as an invasive force that is the reason behind climate change, extinctions and massive 
geologic change. On the other hand, these changes prove that the human is in fact helpless and 
just another speck in the universe that is absorbed into nature. In Walden, Henry David Thoreau 
reflects on the natural beauty of Walden Pond, commenting that its splendor will never perish no 
matter what changes occur:  
Walden is a perfect forest mirror, set round with stones as precious to my eye as if 
fewer or rarer. Nothing so fair, so pure, and at the same time so large, as a lake, 
perchance, lies on the surface of the earth. Sky water. It needs no fence. Nations 
come and go without defiling it. It is a mirror which no stone can crack, whose 
quicksilver will never wear off, whose gilding Nature continually repairs; no 
storms, no dust, can dim its surface ever fresh;—a mirror in which all impurity 
presented to it sinks, swept and dusted by the sun’s hazy brush,—this the light 
dust-cloth,—which retains no breath that is breathed on it, but sends its own to 
float as clouds high above its surface, and be reflected in its bosom still. (Thoreau 
250-251) 
In the mid-nineteenth century, Walden Pond was a serene and seemingly untouched place as 
described by Thoreau. He imagined it would always remain ever beautiful – “It needs no fence. 
Nations come and go without defiling it” (250). However, Thoreau was wrong. Today, Walden 
Pond is not the same place it was almost two centuries ago. It is still Thoreau’s “perfect forest 
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mirror” but the pond reflects human activity instead, as it is full of people, trash, and excretions. 
The increased phosphorus content of the pond causes murkiness and threatens the survival of 
green algae at the bottom of the pond (Giaimo). In a Thoreau-esque account, journalist Cara 
Giaimo describes Walden Pond - “A Target bag floats on the surface of the lake. Kids play on 
the railroad tracks, which are just a few yards from one of the pond’s edges. A man in a beach 
chair reads about toe fungus…People’s belongings are strewn through the underbrush and almost 
meld with the landscape” (Giaimo). In the era of the Anthropocene, Walden Pond is perhaps a 
microcosm of the rest of the world.  
Ozeki wrestles with similar concerns in Tale revolving around climate change and the 
relationship between the human and the nonhuman. When the protagonist Nao watches the Insect 
Wars take place on television, she bursts into tears in a moment of abjection. She says, “The 
sight of these stupid bugs tearing each other apart was too much for me. It was horrible, but of 
course it wasn’t the insects. It was the human beings who thought this would be fun to watch” 
(Ozeki 291). Nao’s statement captures the ethical dilemma of the Anthropocene, where the 
human being is both an agent of change as well as a helpless figure amidst the forces of nature in 
the Anthropocene. The Anthropocene is a geological epoch dominated by human activity 
causing climate change around the world. However, with the environmental transformations 
taking place, the human being gets submerged within nonhuman nature and loses control of its 
place in the world. Kevin Grove and David Chandler say, “Today, the Anthropocene destabilises 
the very ground on which the fragile façade of modernity rests. This sense of uncertainty in the 
face of forces beyond the control or knowledge of the human – that tallies with the Kantian 
subject confronting the moment of the sublime – transpires at the end of modernity both as a 
destructive force and as a potentially liberating one” (80). However, is this decentering of the 
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human, or posthumanism as it is known today, a positive and liberating worldview or a negative 
and destructive one? This question is one of the many questions my thesis delves into. “What is 
at stake here is not so much a challenge to the ‘renaturalising of politics’ (immersing ‘Man’ in 
the world of flux and contingency) but rather a question of what is at stake in assumptions of the 
end of the modernist separations of ‘Man’ and ‘Nature’ along with fixed spatial and temporal 
ontology of modernity” (81-82). As the Anthropocene brings forth the end of a human-centric 
world, there is a subsequent shift in the larger ethical and political structures of the world as well. 
Tale mainly deals with critical posthumanism which tries to deconstruct the existing 
humanist binaries to give rise to a new materialist world, one where such binaries are absent. 
Critical posthumanism tries “to think about problems, aspirations and desires that are familiar 
from humanism” but without the understanding of the “normative, centering concept of the 
human—the very cause of the problem with humanism in the first place” (Callus et al. 108).2 In 
order to break free from humanist norms, the posthumanist project focuses on reconfigurations of 
existing binaries, thereby moving away from humanist hierarchies but also situating the human 
within real-world phenomena in a new way.3 Posthumanist theories of new materialism believe 
                                                 
2 It is also important to note that posthumanism and the posthuman are two very different 
terms. While posthumanism is a discourse, the posthuman is an “impending historical 
circumstance” (Callus et al. 107). Thus, the posthuman is still not completely realized today 
because we are still in the midst of posthumanism. 
3 Callus and his colleagues argue, “A cosmopolitical posthumanism would not centre 
itself on the human/animal distinction, since undoing that hierarchy would not be sufficient. 
Rather, it is concerned with all of the ways in which the ‘human’ of humanism can be radically 
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that we “should not divide human corporeality from a wider material world, but should instead 
submerse the human within the material flows, exchanges, and interactions of substances, 
habitats, places, and environments” (Alaimo, “New Materialisms, Old Humanisms, or, 
Following the Submersible” 281). This immersive aspect of new materialism seamlessly 
intermingles the human with its environment, which eliminates the existing nature-culture 
binary. The eradication of this binary creates a non-dialectical materialism that resists 
differentiation of the human ontologically and epistemologically.  
Tale not only features a posthuman world but also takes the form of a posthuman literary 
narrative. Nao’s diary serves as an example of posthumanist literature, as it is written by Nao, 
disseminated by the ocean waves, and parts of the narrative are created by the Jungle Crow. The 
novel’s exploration of literature as being a posthuman construct is closely related to the shifting 
boundaries between nature and culture in the posthuman era. While nature refers to the 
environmental world in this novel, culture can broadly be seen as including the human and 
human creations of literature within it. Braidotti understands the posthuman condition to be the 
result of a breakdown in the age-old binary between nature and culture, which ultimately leads to 
a unity between the two. She says the social constructivist approach “which rests on the binary 
opposition between the given and the constructed, is currently being replaced by a non-dualistic 
understanding of nature-culture interaction” (The Posthuman 3). This non-dualistic approach is a 
                                                 
decentred and shown to be biologically, ecologically and zoologically imbricated in changing 
forms and practices of understanding, as well as in emergent informatic, mediatic or 
technological situatedness” (109). 
Ghosh 7 
consequence of the posthuman nature of the world, resulting from larger historical changes.4 
Michel Foucault seemed to have predicted the rise of posthumanism in the 1960s, saying “If 
those arrangements [of knowledge] were to disappear as they appeared...then one can certainly 
wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea” (29).5 
However, the posthumanist literary narrative does not completely eradicate the human figure as 
seen in Tale. Instead, as the nature-culture binary slowly diminishes, this collapse reveals 
interconnections between the human and the environment, and between literary creation and the 
environment as well. 
Within the posthuman framework, we are at a critical moment when the nature-culture 
binary collapses. My thesis will explore the position of Tale and its potential ethics and politics 
given this posthuman turn. Ozeki’s Tale captures the posthuman turn in the literary narrative as it 
features a disparity between a posthuman view of the universe where humans do not matter and 
                                                 
4 Braidotti adds that “the boundaries between the categories of the natural and the cultural 
have been displaced and to a large extent blurred by the effects of scientific and technological 
advances” (The Posthuman 3). Thus, the shift in thought is primarily because of historical 
changes taking place in the world. 
5 While Braidotti and other scholars argue that posthumanism is a result of science and 
technology, Foucault and even Jacques Derrida point to language as being the cause. Foucault 
says, “Man had been a figure occurring between two modes of language; or, rather, he was 
constituted only when language, having been situated within representation and, as it were, 
dissolved in it, freed itself from that situation at the cost of its own fragmentation: man 
composed his own figure in the interstices of that fragmented language” (28). 
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the power of human will and the human being’s significance in the world. As Ruth reads Nao’s 
diary, she experiences dream visions where a wild crow and time itself help her change Nao’s 
narrative, making literary creation a posthuman endeavor. Tale further grapples with the 
dilemma of the human cosmopolitan in a posthuman world as the nomadic characters reflect the 
figure of the cosmopolitan nomad. In the past, the cosmopolitan nomad could still see itself as a 
concrete human subject despite lacking spatial representation; today, the nomad lacks even this 
epistemological framework to hold on to. However, Tale turns to a temporal mode of 
cosmopolitanism through the notion of “the time being” to encapsulate the human and the 
nonhuman within it. But temporal logic diminishes the ethics and politics of the cosmopolitan 
worldview due to the ontological challenges to reality; therefore, the novel turns to affective 
cosmopolitanism instead to materialize the cosmopolitan connection, while still maintaining an 
ethics and politics for the cosmopolitan subject in a posthuman world. By struggling with the 
cosmopolitan representation of the human subject in a posthuman world, Ozeki’s A Tale for the 
Time Being turns to the materiality of literary and environmental affect to advocate an affective 
model of cosmopolitanism in the world. 
Through the diary, the literary worlding in Tale not only creates a materiality of affect, 
but this materiality causes the cosmopolitan project to become noticeable in the world. Brian 
Massumi refers to affect as a “felt quality,” or “a metaphysics of feeling” which preempts 
semiosis (63). Tale features multiple literary worlds as it depicts Ruth reading Nao’s diary, who 
in turn reads her great-uncle Haruki’s diary within her own literary narrative. However, there is a 
strange intermixing between these literary worlds, where each reader and writer impacts each 
other’s narratives and contributes to literary creation. When Ruth comes across missing words in 
Nao’s diary, Ruth’s husband Oliver chalks the strangeness of the situation down to quantum 
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theory, saying “It’s just that I’m wondering if maybe there’s a quantum element to what’s 
happening…I’m just thinking that if everything you’re looking for disappears, maybe you should 
stop looking. Maybe you should focus on what’s tangible in the here and now” (Ozeki 232).  By 
focusing on the material present, Ruth is ultimately able to find Nao’s missing words through the 
clues left for her by the Jungle Crow. However, the reading of Nao’s narrative is only made 
possible through nature’s intervention in the world whether through the crow’s cawing or the 
relentless ocean waves. Affective cosmopolitanism shows the interconnections between the 
human and the nonhuman world, while also emphasizing the volition of the posthuman world in 
its affective stance. 
My thesis follows a three-part structure to first understand the dilemma of posthuman 
cosmopolitanism that the novel struggles with within the form of the literary narrative and then 
locate the ways in which Tale reconceives this tension. First, I will examine the posthuman turn 
in the literary narrative by focusing on Nao’s diary and metafictional representation within Tale. 
Second, I will analyze the temporal mode of cosmopolitanism in the novel brought forth through 
Nao’s notion of “the time being”; however, this mode leads to an elimination of ethics and 
politics in the posthuman world. Third, I will focus on affective cosmopolitanism within the 
novel, as I perceive literary and environmental affects as the primary ways in which Tale 
negotiates the problem of posthuman cosmopolitanism and brings forth a new ethics and politics. 
However, although the novel does hint at the politics of affective cosmopolitanism, it largely 
deals with the ethical implications. 
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The Posthuman Turn in the Literary Narrative 
The novel initially sees literature as a human construct owing to Ruth’s own experiences 
as a writer. As she tries to work on her mother’s memoir, Ruth finds herself struggling to pen 
down her ideas. She believes this problem is due to a lack of human contact and the encroaching 
rainforest which surrounds her home on the tiny island in the Pacific Northwest. When Ruth 
finds herself missing New York, she explains that it is because of her passion for human culture 
as a novelist: 
She missed the built environment of New York City. It was only in an urban 
landscape, amid straight lines and architecture, that she could situate herself in 
human time and history. As a novelist, she needed this. She missed people. She 
missed human intrigue, drama and power struggles. She needed her own species, 
not to talk to, necessarily, but just to be among, as a bystander in a crowd or an 
anonymous witness. But here on the sparsely populated island, human culture 
barely existed. (Ozeki 61) 
After being surrounded by human culture in New York City, Ruth considers the Pacific 
Northwest a place where the natural environment overshadows the human quite literally in terms 
of the immense rainforests but also in terms of the scarcity of people living there. Ruth presumes 
that literature can only be located in a humanist environment since a posthuman space such as 
the island in the Pacific Northwest does not grant agency to the human figure and therefore 
literature cannot be created. Ruth emphasizes the relationship between the human and the 
literary, refusing to believe that an alternative scenario may exist. She adds that from the 
standpoint of a novelist, literature needs the human to situate itself in “human time and history” 
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(61). Therefore, Ruth views literature as both a product of human creation as well as a medium 
through which specifically human stories are told and shared. 
The world has always seen literature as a humanist phenomenon. Whether it be for the 
purpose of representing human emotion or to share human stories across time and space, the 
literary narrative has always been selfishly human with the environment merely existing in the 
background. Rachel Greenwald Smith attributes one of the reasons for the humanistic tendencies 
of literature to the affective hypothesis, or “the belief that literature is at its most meaningful 
when it represents and transmits the emotional specificity of personal experience” (1). She goes 
on to say that this hypothesis functions invisibly and seeps into almost every discipline and 
movement as “we read works of literature because they allow us direct contact with individuals 
who are like us but not us…they provoke empathy” (1). This relationship between the human 
and the literary continues to exist even through the current century when Ruth cannot help but 
blame the rainforest for her writer’s block in Tale, creating a metafictional moment connecting 
the present-day state of literature to the novel’s exploration of literary creation.6  
                                                 
6 Although my thesis focuses on the posthuman form of subjectivity, Mojca Krevel looks 
at the postmodern literary subject in Tale and illustrates that the diminishing boundary between 
the real and the fictive in the novel mirrors postmodern creation of identity. Although the 
postmodern and the posthuman notions of the subject often overlap, posthumanism transcends 
the human and takes into account the environment and technology, making everything a subject. 
On the other hand, postmodernism leads to the death of the subject and human beings become 
object-like themselves as a result of their fractal natures. Therefore, posthumanism and 
postmodernism differ in the ways they eliminate the subject-object binary. 
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This metafictional turn seems to signify the rejection of posthumanism by the form of the 
novel initially as the character Ruth embodies the author Ruth Ozeki in this instance when she 
speaks about the humanist process of literary creation. Tale is centered on the process of Ruth 
reading the protagonist Nao’s diary, leading to the assumption that the diary should provide a 
glimpse into her life and what it means to be human. Ruth often reads Nao’s narrative from a 
humanistic perspective and she says, “she couldn’t help but feel a strong sense of karmic 
connection with the girl and her father. The diary had washed up on Ruth’s shoreline, after all” 
(Ozeki 311). Ruth disregards the environmental agency involved in the process of reading Nao’s 
narrative and simply thinks of the diary as a humanistic creation where Nao is the only figure 
that matters. In fact, Ruth often ignores the posthuman aspects of Nao’s narrative, and even 
berates her husband Oliver for straying from a humanistic perspective – “After everything she’d 
just read – about Nao’s life, the girl’s father, her situation at school – that [Oliver’s] mind would 
alight upon the crows! There were so many other more pressing things she would have preferred 
to discuss” (54). Ruth holds a stubbornly humanistic outlook toward literature, even refusing to 
take into consideration the opinions of other humans with regards to the analysis of the diary. 
She assumes that the ocean brought the diary to her to facilitate a human connection between her 
and Nao, rather than seeing this moment for what it is - a random act of nature.  
However, Ruth’s attempt to read Nao’s diary in this humanistic manner is not an isolated 
event. Nao too begins writing in the diary with a wholly humanistic aim of recording a human 
life story. Nao begins her journal by saying, “My purpose for writing it before I die is to tell 
someone the fascinating life story of my hundred-and-four-year-old-great-grandmother, who is a 
Zen Buddhist nun” (5). Although life writing is her initial goal, the diary quickly turns into a 
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posthumanist narrative as she realizes the futility of focusing on a humanist narrative in the 
Anthropocene era. She says:  
I want to leave something real behind. But what can I write about that’s real? 
Sure, I can write about all the bad shit that’s happened to me, and my feelings 
about my dad and my mom and my so-called friend, but I don’t particularly want 
to. Whenever I think about my stupid empty life, I come to the conclusion that 
I’m just wasting my time, and I’m not the only one…And if time is lost forever, 
what does that mean? It’s not like you get to die any sooner, right? (22)  
Although Nao does not necessarily refer to the Anthropocene in this scene, her preoccupation 
with the nature of time and the death of the human brings to mind the notion of deep time. Deep 
time refers to geologic time that goes beyond the human scale of time (Dimock 759-760).7 From 
a deep time perspective, the human figure does not matter and in a sense, is already dead. Thus, 
Nao’s journal slowly unravels from a humanistic narrative to a posthumanist tale that 
understands the insignificance of the human figure in the world. 
In fact, Nao often perceives herself as an insignificant figure in her very own narrative. 
When Nao questions, “Would I be washed out to sea?,” she points to the human figure’s 
                                                 
7 Wai Chee Dimock also refers to deep time as “denationalized space” (760), which is 
interesting to think about from a cosmopolitan perspective. There appears to be a pre-human 
quality to the idea of deep time, rather than being posthuman. Yet, I see Nao’s struggle with 
locating the human within this deep time framework as a posthuman struggle, precisely because 
she speaks from the perspective of a migratory individual dealing with the cosmopolitan nature 
of the world. 
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immersion in the sea, thereby foreshadowing a posthuman setting (Ozeki 193). However, by 
doing so, she also conflates the diary’s own material existence with herself since the diary is the 
one that washes out to sea. Nao conflates herself with the diary in this representation, thus 
reducing the importance of both the human figure as well as literary creations produced by the 
human in light of the overpowering agency of the sea. The diary as a form of literature floats out 
to sea and is washed up on the island’s shores, suggesting that the ocean waves have agency over 
the diary’s journey as opposed to a more human model of literary circulation which would 
involve purchasing the book at a bookstore. Thus, the novel showcases a shift from a humanist to 
a posthumanist mode of literary circulation and production.  
Tale portrays the embedded narrative of Nao’s diary as being disseminated and 
eventually created through the agency of the environment. Both the manner in which the diary 
gets to Ruth and the way in which Nao’s narrative unfolds involve nonhuman elements, 
indicating that the human does not have sole authority over the literary narrative. First, the ocean 
is responsible for Ruth finding Nao’s diary in the first place. Ruth says, “The sea was always 
heaving things up and hurling them back” (8), and the discovery of the diary indicates that the 
ocean attains a positive form of agency in the narrative’s journey to Ruth. However, the ocean 
becomes an invasive force as well, since “the damp sea had swollen [the diary’s] pages and the 
silverfish had taken up residence in their spines” (11). As the human object of the diary and the 
oceanic elements intermingle, the duality caused by the nature-culture binary in the novel 
diminishes. The diary becomes a posthuman element where the agency of the narrative becomes 
equally posthuman. Braidotti refers to this force as “zoe,” or a “non-human yet affirmative life 
force...a vitalist materialism…resting solidly on a neo-Spinozist political ontology of monism 
and radical immanence (After Cosmopolitanism 11). In this novel, the ocean becomes this life 
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force that dissolves the narrative within it and decides when and where the diary is brought back 
to the fore time and again. Oliver uses the example of the gyre and the Great Pacific garbage 
patch to explain the way the ocean takes control of the story - “Anything that doesn’t sink or 
escape from the gyre gets sucked up into the middle of a garbage patch…The diary and letters 
disintegrating, unread. But instead it got washed up on the beach below Jap Ranch, where you 
could find it… As in the-universe-provides kind of amazing?” (Ozeki 36).8 By attributing the 
journey of the diary to the oceanic forces, the novel points to literary circulation as a posthuman 
process, in the sense that both the human and the nonhuman are equally involved in its 
materialization and distribution across the world. 
                                                 
8 Petra Fachinger also brings up the intermingling of the local and the global with regards 
to the environment as she explores the ecological issues in Tale through a transnational lens and 
draws connections between global capitalism and degradation of the environment. She writes, “A 
Tale for the Time Being makes it clear that the local and the global have become interconnected 
to such a degree that even a secluded place like Cortes Island does not remain unaffected by acts 
of mass violence and by natural and human-made disasters elsewhere in the world” (Fachinger 
50). Drawing on Rob Nixon’s theory of slow violence, Fachinger argues that the novel makes 
visible the connections between social and environmental injustice, and thereby promotes 
“environmentally inflected global citizenship” (54). While I concede that the link between the 
social world and the environmental world is of utmost importance within this novel, I believe 
that the reason for this association lies in the posthuman state of the world that the novel 
promotes and already exists within. 
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Ozeki responds to the intermingling of the human and the nonhuman in the material 
world by using a posthuman form of the literary novel through the help of layers of metafiction. 
Metafiction refers to fiction which emphasizes its own constructed nature to remind the reader of 
the artificiality of the literary work. Tale features a double metafictional move by portraying the 
character Ruth’s writing process, while also showing Ruth reading about Nao’s writing process 
in her diary, which is a representation of metafiction within metafiction. These dual layers of 
metafiction interact because of the agency of the oceanic elements, which reveals the constructed 
nature of literature both from a literary as well as a material perspective. Tale shows that parts of 
Nao’s narrative are created by the mysterious crow, while the physical diary itself is distributed 
by the ocean. These dual metafictional characteristics speak to Karen Barad’s notion of a 
posthumanist performativity, “a materialist, naturalist, and posthumanist elaboration—that 
allows matter its due as an active participant in the world’s becoming, in its ongoing intra-
activity” (803).9 Barad’s theory of performativity tries to destabilize the agency and power 
accorded to language to represent the world, instead opting for matter’s role in this process. 
There appears to be a shift from linguistic representations to material ontology as Barad proposes 
that “the primary semantic units are not “words” but material-discursive practices through which 
                                                 
9 Barad questions, “Why are language and culture granted their own agency and 
historicity while matter is figured as passive and immutable, or at best inherits a potential for 
change derivatively from language and culture?” (801), thereby pointing to the implicit nature-
culture binary and the notions of inactivity and lack of agency associated with matter in the past. 
However, new materialism tries to overturn this binary as well as the underlying beliefs about 
agency. 
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boundaries are constituted. This dynamism is agency. Agency is not an attribute but the ongoing 
reconfigurings of the world” (818). The novel’s metafictional maneuvers point to literature as a 
material phenomenon that is constantly changing and dynamic in its configurations, leading to a 
world where the human and the nonhuman are constantly shifting in their ontologies. 
The novel’s examination of literature through a posthuman framework frees the diary 
from the bounds of time and space, creating a liminal space in the world for the diary to exist in 
and to exhibit posthuman performativity. When Nao reaches the present “now” of her existence, 
the diary runs out of words, which forces Ruth as the reader to search for the missing words in 
her dream with the help of the aforementioned crow. Ruth says Nao had “just caught up with 
herself. With the now of her story…but the end keeps receding, like an outgoing wave” (Ozeki 
375-76). As Ruth tries to find out what happens to Nao after she reaches the “now” of her 
existence, the ending of the story comes to life as the reader Ruth has to physically reach for it. 
She says, “The word appears on the horizon, black against the unbearable light, and as it comes 
closer, it starts to turn and spiral…and then, fully feathered, it starts to fly” (349). The narrative 
stops being just a narrative and transforms into ontology through the metaphor of the crow as the 
elusive ending. The ending of Nao’s narrative demonstrates posthuman performativity as the 
agency shifts from human hands to those of the nonhuman. With the analogy of the crow and the 
ocean wave, the novel makes the process of reading a posthuman phenomenon that involves 
nonhuman agency. However, this posthuman power also allows the diary’s narrative to have its 
own agency and to travel back and forth between the reader and the writer in a performative 
manner. 
Posthuman performativity not only makes possible the reading of the narrative, but also 
adds to literary creation through magical realist environmental events which affect the story arc. 
Ghosh 18 
Ruth’s Jungle Crow guides her numerous times and helps her find her missing cat as well as the 
missing words at the end of Nao’s diary as mentioned above. However, the crow is not just a 
normal crow; it is anthropomorphized through its perceptive nature and ability to change the 
plot. The crow is said to embody the spirit of Nao’s great-uncle kamikaze pilot Haruki #1, who 
likens himself to the Crow Captain who flies in war, while one of the island inhabitants Muriel 
equates the crow to Grandmother Crow, “one of the magical ancestors who can shape-shift and 
take animal or human form” (258; 96). In this manner, the anthropomorphized crow serves as a 
nonhuman character that is created from human fables and enables the intersection of Ruth’s and 
Nao’s storylines. Oliver tells Ruth, “My theory is that this crow from Nao’s world came here to 
lead you into the dream so you could change the end of her story” (376). Thus, the crow becomes 
a messenger figure that not only transcends the boundaries of cosmopolitan time and space, but 
also blurs the human-nonhuman binary by participating in the creation of the narrative. Through 
the blurring of the binary between the human and the nonhuman, the crow guides the novel 
toward an ontological submersion of the human within the nonhuman by using the literary as its 
medium.  
However, the breakdown of the nature-culture binary does not just reveal associations 
between the human and the environment, but also unravels the unitary human subject. Stacy 
Alaimo uses the oceanic world to describe this phenomenon, saying “the jelly-fish, which seems 
barely to exist as a creature, not only because it is a body without organs but because it is nearly 
indistinguishable from its watery world. Seemingly flimsy and fragile, these gelatinous creatures 
are nonetheless thriving” (“New Materialisms, Old Humanisms, or, Following the Submersible” 
283). Trans-corporeality, or a move away from the physical body, causes the human to become 
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equally immersed in the earthly world, therefore losing its unitary nature.10 She adds that marine 
life “fosters complex mappings of agencies and interactions in which—for humans as well as for 
pelagic and benthic creatures—there is, ultimately, no firm divide between mind and matter, 
organism and environment, self and world” (283). Thus, the elimination of binaries creates a 
non-dialectical kind of materialism, which changes the understanding of the human subject as 
well.  
Nao too is a human with a fragmented sense of identity owing to the collapse of the 
human-nonhuman binary in her narrative. In Tale, Nao struggles with the decentering of the 
human subject due to the constant tension between the human and posthuman worlds in the 
novel. When Nao goes to the beach, she battles with this very question as she considers her 
significance in the world with respect to the ocean waves: 
                                                 
10 Stacy Alaimo emphasizes that trans-corporeality “opens up a mobile “space” that 
acknowledges the often unpredictable and unwanted actions of human bodies, non-human 
creatures, ecological systems, chemical agents, and other actors” (“New Materialisms, Old 
Humanisms, or, Following the Submersible” 282). Alaimo’s notion of a transcorporeal space 
seems to be derived from Pickering’s idea of a “posthumanist space [as] a space in which the 
human actors are still there but now inextricably entangled with the nonhuman, no longer at the 
center of the action calling the shots” (26). However, while Pickering’s concept of entanglement 
is epistemological in order to think about what a posthuman framework looks like, Alaimo sees it 
from an ontological perspective. New materialism therefore creates a space where previously 
ignored material and immaterial phenomena in the world arising from these interconnections can 
be recognized, while also giving agency and embodiment to them. 
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Have you ever tried to bully a wave?…I smacked the wave with the stick, cutting 
through it, but the water kept coming. I ran back up the beach and escaped, but 
the next one knocked me over. I got to my feet and attacked again and again, and 
each time the water crashed down on top of me, grinding me against the 
rock….the violence of the waves felt powerful and real…the next time I fell 
down, I just lay there and let the waves wash over me, and I wondered what 
would happen if I stopped trying to get back up. Just let my body go. Would I be 
washed out to sea? (Ozeki 189-193) 
Nao illustrates the internal struggle in her mind by battling with the waves, attempting to achieve 
the humanist ideal of having more agency than the waves. However, she also speculates about a 
scenario wherein she sheds her notion of being the dominant human subject and instead allows 
the ocean to submerse her within it. Nao ends up leaning more toward the latter; however, such 
posthumanist thought causes Nao to experience uncertainty about her human self. This anxiety 
seeps into the literary narrative of Nao’s diary within the novel and adds to its posthuman nature, 
while also disintegrating the unitary human subject. 
With the shift from humanism to posthumanism in the form of the novel, there is also a 
subsequent shift in ethics and politics that takes place. Alaimo says, “As the material self cannot 
be disentangled from networks that are simultaneously economic, political, cultural, scientific, 
and substantial, what was once the ostensibly bounded human subject finds herself in a swirling 
landscape of uncertainty where practices and actions that were once not considered in ethical or 
political terms suddenly become the very stuff of the crises at hand” (“New Materialisms, Old 
Humanisms, or, Following the Submersible” 282). While ethical and political concerns were 
primarily within the domain of the human before, they now become a part of other material and 
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immaterial elements in the world which were previously outside the realm of ethics and 
politics.11 This entanglement makes the human being just another aspect of the world and leads 
to the creation of posthuman literature, as seen in Tale.  
Tale wrestles with the ethical and political implications of posthumanism when Nao’s 
great-uncle and kamikaze pilot Haruki #1 is forced to choose between attacking the American 
battleships during World War II and sacrificing his life to the ocean waves. Haruki’s utter 
perplexity with regards to his decision leads to him handing over agency to the environment. In 
his letters, Haruki imagines himself as the Crow Captain who flies off to do battle (Ozeki 258), 
thereby using a nonhuman figuration of the human to signify his purpose as a kamikaze pilot. 
However, the pivotal moment is when Haruki #1 chooses not to aim his plane at the American 
battleships in World War II, but instead decides to fly into the waves: 
In the end, then, what volition will arise in me? Will I bravely hold my plane’s 
course steady, knowing that at the moment of contact my body will explode in a 
ball of flames and kill so many of my so-called enemy, whom I have never met 
and whom I cannot hate? Or will cowardice (or my better human nature) rally one 
last time, just long enough to nudge my hand on the control stick and turn my 
plane off course, so that by choosing to end my life in watery disgrace…I will 
                                                 
11 At the end of Bodily Natures: Science, Environment, and the Material Self, Alaimo 
advocates an ethics “that is not circumscribed by the human but is instead accountable to a 
material world that is never merely an external place but always the very substance of ourselves 
and others” (158). Therefore, from a new materialist approach, ethics and politics need to be 
made part of a larger realm in order to matter in the world. 
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(save lives)…the very outcome of this war will be decided by a moment and a 
millimeter, representing the outward manifestation of my will. But how am I to 
know?...Knowing what I do about the depravity with which this war has been 
waged, I am determined to do my utmost to steer my plane away from my target 
and into the seas. Better to do battle with the waves, who may yet forgive me. 
(325-28) 
By making the decision to save lives, albeit giving up his own, Haruki appears to promote human 
life and human will. However, this agency is portrayed as a posthuman quality rather than 
something Haruki voluntarily chooses to do, as he says, “In the end, then, what volition will arise 
in me?...or will cowardice (or my better human nature) rally one last time…” (325). Haruki’s 
inability to take responsibility for his own decision makes it seem as if the environment is the 
one taking over this agency. By choosing to battle with the waves instead of other humans, he 
opts for a posthuman ethical framework by locating forgiveness in the waves, rather than in the 
human. The motif of the waves links Nao and Haruki’s stories together as they both battle 
internally between humanist and posthumanist understandings of the world. However, Haruki 
believes the decision will magically materialize in front of him, emerging not from within the 
human but rather from the surrounding world. Haruki’s choice of the waves showcases a 
posthuman agency that shifts the ethics and politics of the posthuman novel.  
Tale showcases the attributes of a posthuman novel in both its dual metafictional form 
and its portrayal of environmental agency. However, with the shift from a humanist to a 
posthuman novel, the ethics and politics of the posthuman novel come into question. If the 
human no longer plays a significant role in the form of the novel, the ethical and political 
dilemmas of the human also fall away, as in the case of Haruki. As he gives over agency to the 
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ocean waves, the soldier’s ethical dilemma to attack or not to attack also gets eliminated due to 
the agency of the environment. Therefore, the question arises as to what the ethics and politics of 
the posthuman novel looks like. One of the main concerns that the novel struggles with is the 
cosmopolitan project as seen in Nao and Ruth’s migratory narratives. Humanist literature is often 
seen as a way to further the cosmopolitan cause. Cosmopolitanism as a movement is also guilty 
of being humanist precisely because it sees literature as a tool to connect human beings across 
distances through the sharing of stories. Kwame Anthony Appiah says, “One characteristic of 
European cosmopolitanism, especially since the Enlightenment, has been a receptiveness to art 
and literature from other places, and a wider interest in lives elsewhere” (4). This intellectual 
awareness, in turn, leads to “the recognition that human beings are different and that we can 
learn from each other’s differences” (4). As literature centered on the human becomes a mode of 
furthering the goal of cosmopolitanism, the cosmopolitan subject also becomes equally restricted 
to the human species.  However, with the posthuman turn in literature, ethics and politics shifts 
as the cosmopolitan subject moves beyond the human figure to incorporate the environment as 
well.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ghosh 24 
Temporal Cosmopolitanism 
Tale features cosmopolitan subjects trapped in a posthuman world, yet cosmopolitanism 
initially emerged as a normative and humanist term used to describe a world with a single, 
shared community of people. One of the earliest to do so, Immanuel Kant first explains his 
cosmopolitan ideas in 1784, saying “there is enough to justify a hope that after many revolutions 
and re-modellings of states, the supreme purpose of nature will be accomplished in the 
establishment of a cosmopolitic state as the bosom in which all the original tendencies of the 
human species are to be developed” (391).12 However, Kant believes that cosmopolitanism is a 
possibility only within the human species because man is the “sole rational creature upon earth” 
(386).13 This humanist understanding of cosmopolitanism is quite essential to the cosmopolitan 
project in Kant’s day; however, in the posthuman novel Tale, Ozeki abandons a humanist model 
of cosmopolitanism because it fails to take into account the environmental elements participating 
                                                 
12 In comparison to current ideas about cosmopolitanism, Kant’s understanding seems to 
be more political since he says he is interested in “the establishment of a perfect constitution of 
society”, or a “commonwealth” (388). Of course, this political aspect is the thing that makes 
Kant’s idea of cosmopolitanism so unachievable, resulting in its rejection by later scholars. 
13 Although Kant’s strong humanist opinions may seem a bit out of place in current 
literary discourse, it is important to note that he wrote this essay during the Enlightenment, 
which celebrated man and reason. However, what strikes me as surprising is that this humanist 
understanding of cosmopolitanism continues to this day, even when we have moved to a 
posthuman framework of looking at the world. See Higgins for more information on why the 
cosmopolitan humanist stubbornly refuses to use a broader approach to look at cosmopolitanism. 
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in the cosmopolitan framework. Within the humanist model, Appiah describes the world as a 
“global tribe” and an individual being a “citizen of the world” (xiii; xv).14 However, he tries to 
construct the cosmopolitan subject in a normative manner by considering the ethical 
requirements needed to create the perfect cosmopolitan society, limiting individual differences to 
the realm of the human.15 However, a truly cosmopolitan society in the posthuman world must 
transcend the human figure and move away from ethical and political norms in order to be 
considered cosmopolitan at all, which is what Ozeki tries to do through a posthuman model. In 
this posthuman model, Ozeki moves toward a temporal mode of cosmopolitanism as opposed to 
the spatial mode linked to humanist cosmopolitanism. 
                                                 
14 However, as Appiah himself rightly points out, the Cynics of the fourth century BC 
coined the term cosmopolitan, intending it to mean “citizen of the cosmos”, where “the cosmos 
referred to the world, not in the sense of the earth, but in the sense of the universe” (xiv). This 
point makes me wonder whether the Cynics had a more posthuman understanding of the term, 
which somehow got lost after Enlightenment discourse came into the picture. See Kant for more 
information on cosmopolitan ideas during the Enlightenment. 
15 Appiah rightly argues, “cosmopolitanism is not the name of the solution but of the 
challenge” (xv). I think Appiah is correct in viewing cosmopolitanism as a difficult ideal to 
recreate in society; however, it is because of the normative way in which he views the concept of 
cosmopolitanism that he starts facing this dilemma. He goes on to specify that the cosmopolitan 
individual needs to acquire an “openness to the world”, “exposure to the range of human customs 
and beliefs”, and “truth and reason” (5; 6; 26), all of which describe the cosmopolitan subject 
normatively. 
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At the outset, Ozeki recognizes the spatial nature of the preexisting humanist 
cosmopolitan perspective. Cosmopolitanism has always been linked to this idea of lacking a 
specific nation state to call home. In Tale, both Nao and Ruth lack a fixed place to call home. 
Nao finds her home in zazen, or meditation, which her grandmother teaches her, and she says, 
“You return your mind to zazen, it feels like coming home...Zazen is a home you can’t ever lose” 
(Ozeki 182-183); however, home becomes a physically intangible space for Nao through this 
strategy. Ruth is also unsure of home as a concrete place and says, “I don’t know what home 
would feel like” (234). Cosmopolitanism remains a physically intangible concept in the world for 
Ruth and Nao because of their lack of a spatial home. This uncertainty makes Ruth and Nao 
unsure of their ontological and temporal existences as well. However, the novel foregoes this 
spatially objective approach to cosmopolitanism and perceives it as a project of world-making 
instead, striving to bring the human and the nonhuman under the cosmopolitan umbrella of “the 
time being.” This shift from spatial logic to temporality opens up the cosmopolitan worldview to 
a different kind of political framework, not based on nation states. Instead, the novel looks 
toward temporality as the cosmopolitan idea of home.16 
Although Tale utilizes a cosmopolitan framework to understand the meaning of “the time 
being,” it departs from the traditional normative notions of cosmopolitanism. When Nao first 
starts writing in her journal, she wonders about the identity of the reader, saying, “Are you a 
male or a female or somewhere in between? Are you in a New York subway car… Sunnyvale… 
                                                 
16 Of course, Ozeki could just abandon the cosmopolitan project altogether; however, she 
remains committed to the idea of the cosmopolitan connection and attempts to redefine the 
stringent nature of humanist cosmopolitanism, rather than rejecting it completely. 
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Phuket… Brighton?” (3). These questions pointing to differences in place and gender suggest 
cosmopolitan human difference.17 However, at the end, she says that “it doesn’t matter very 
much, because by the time you read this, everything will be different and you will be nowhere in 
particular, flipping idly through the pages of this book...wondering if you should keep on 
reading” (3). By pointing to changed notions of temporality in the literary process of reading, 
Nao dissolves cosmopolitan difference by hinting at its overall insignificance within time itself. 
In this sense, the novel moves toward a posthuman understanding of cosmopolitanism by using 
the temporal limit as the point of connection. 
In Tale, time serves as the cosmopolitan connection between the human and the 
nonhuman. Time appears to be the only concrete variable in the novel as the novel starts blurring 
the boundary between the human and the environment by including them under the same 
umbrella of “the time being.” Nao’s grandmother Jiko equates the human and the nonhuman 
saying, “Surfer, wave, same thing…A wave is born from deep conditions of the ocean. A person 
is born from deep conditions of the world. A person pokes up from the world and rolls along like 
                                                 
17 It is interesting to note that while I see the conflict between holism and difference as a 
mark of cosmopolitan identity within the novel, Marlo Starr believes that this conflicted 
subjectivity hints at a feminist portrayal of Nao and Ruth’s transnational connection. Starr 
examines embodiments of feminism in Tale and claims that transnational feminism is the 
alternative to cyber- and Buddhist feminisms, as it allows for empowerment through materiality 
as well as disembodiment. Although I think that the materiality and disembodiment of the 
characters in the novel definitely play a role in shaping subjectivity, these characteristics may not 
necessarily translate to a purely feminist model. 
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a wave, until it is time to sink down again” (194). This connection of beings involves a struggle 
to make sense of cosmopolitanism through a posthuman framework. However, the novel uses 
Jiko’s non-dualistic understanding of the world to create a new kind of cosmopolitanism, one 
that includes nonhuman nature and time as well as the human. Nao says, “Form is emptiness and 
emptiness is form…I think it means that nothing in the world is solid or real, because nothing is 
permanent, and all things – including trees and animals and pebbles and mountains and rivers 
and even me and you – are just kind of flowing through for the time being” (106-107).18 The 
novel not only goes against the traditional humanist understanding of cosmopolitanism but also 
points to the ongoing reconfiguration of all beings, which defies normativity.  
The concept of cosmopolitan difference takes on a new political role as it transcends the 
boundaries of the human in Tale. Rosi Braidotti advocates a “nomadic form of reflexive 
cosmopolitanism,” where she looks at the concept of difference as a hierarchical notion in the 
past as a way to highlight an “implicit norm” (After Cosmopolitanism 12). Moving away from 
prior conceptions of cosmopolitan difference, Braidotti looks at the cosmopolitan subject in a 
new way which frees the cosmopolitan subject from the bounds of capitalism, while still 
maintaining its existence in the world. She says, “The nomadic subject is a performative image, a 
                                                 
18 Drawing on this notion of “the time being,” Sue Lovell attempts to uncover new forms 
of posthuman subjectivity in Tale through narratological methods. She claims posthumanist 
narratives like Tale shape identity representationally, discursively and actively to generate shifts 
in reader consciousness. While I believe that the connection between the reader and the writer is 
significant in Tale, it is also equally important for Tale’s posthuman take to consider the 
implications of literary affects, as I will discuss later on. 
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political myth that allows me to weave together different levels of my experience…a 
postmetaphysical vision of subjectivity” (Nomadic Subjects 29). By denying the ontological 
existence of the nomadic subject and moving on to an epistemological representation, Braidotti 
looks at the kinds of politics that the nomadic subject can engender. She says, “The nomad 
enacts transitions without a teleological purpose;…the rhizome stands for a nomadic political 
ontology, that…provides relational foundations for a posthumanist view of subjectivity. 
Nomadic consciousness is a form of political resistance to hegemonic, fixed, unitary, and 
exclusionary views of subjectivity” (58).19 Thus, Braidotti’s rhizomatic understanding of 
cosmopolitan difference offers current cosmopolitan discourse a non-hierarchical political 
framework as opposed to previous normative theories of cosmopolitanism. 
Current cosmopolitan discourse tries to include the nonhuman within it and critically 
examines humanist cosmopolitanism’s normative and subsequently dialectical outlook. Rebecca 
Walkowitz terms critical cosmopolitanism, as a “type of international engagement that can be 
distinguished from “planetary humanism” by…an aversion to heroic tones of appropriation and 
progress, and a suspicion of epistemological privilege, views from above or from the center that 
                                                 
19 Here, the idea of the rhizome refers to Deleuze’s nomadic mode of figuration, where 
Deleuze contrasts the rhizomatic root (a root that grows sideways) with the linear roots of trees. 
Braidotti says, “it is “as if” the rhizomatic mode expressed a nonphallogocentric way of thinking: 
secret, lateral spreading as opposed to the visible, vertical ramifications of Western trees of 
knowledge” (Nomadic Subjects 58). 
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assume a consistent distinction between who is seeing and what is seen” (2).20 This critical 
approach to cosmopolitanism has resulted in many scholars refusing to define the term 
cosmopolitanism, saying that “cosmopolitanism refers to a philosophical project and also to an 
attitude” (5), since it is a constantly changing project derived from the ongoing epistemological 
frameworks in the world.21 This refusal to define cosmopolitanism further shifts the 
cosmopolitan project from being normative to a post-normative one, which “cultivates a process 
of differentiation that produces an ever-broader spectrum of identities,” which are mutable and 
un-made (Cherniavsky, “Neocitizenship and Critique” 20). With this reconfiguration of identities 
geared toward the future, the cosmopolitan project becomes embedded in the idea of future 
possibilities rather than present perception. Pheng Cheah says, “since one cannot see the 
universe, the world, or humanity, the cosmopolitan optic is not one of perceptual experience but 
of the imagination” (26). Cheah foregoes the normativity usually associated with 
cosmopolitanism because it is closely linked to the already existing dialectical relationships in 
                                                 
20 It is important to note that cosmopolitanism has always been critical in its approach, as 
Walkowitz points out. Kant himself made sure to give cosmopolitans the power to question the 
status quo; however, critical cosmopolitanism “implies a new reflection about reflection,” or a 
critique of critique (Walkowitz 3). 
21 At the beginning of a collection of essays called Cosmopolitanism, the editors write, 
“specifying cosmopolitanism positively and definitively is an uncosmopolitan thing to do” 
(Pollock et al. 1). I find this point quite insightful because it proves just how obscure and broad 
cosmopolitanism as a term truly is. 
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the world.22 Instead, Cheah sees the world “as an ongoing, dynamic process of becoming, 
something continually made and re-made rather than a spatial geographical entity” (30-31). This 
kind of dynamic approach to cosmopolitanism opens up cosmopolitan discourse to other 
variables besides the normative human figure, such as time and matter, as well as the ability to 
explore the human aspect more thoroughly without normative constraints. 
Drawing on its title, Tale features time as the medium for a global posthuman politics, 
which overturns the fundamental nature of the cosmopolitan movement. Nao says, “A time being 
is someone who lives in time, and that means you, and me, and every one of us who is, or was, or 
ever will be” (Ozeki 3). Through this definition of a time being, Nao emphasizes the posthuman 
nature of the time being by collapsing all of humanity as well as the environment into one mass 
conglomeration existing in time. The novel draws on Buddhist philosophy and says, “Time itself 
is being and all being is time…In essence, everything in the entire universe is intimately linked 
with each other as moments in time, continuous and separate” (30). As time becomes responsible 
for the cosmopolitan connection between the human and the nonhuman, the nature of 
                                                 
22 Cheah’s point is significant because he considers the way in which literature is apt for 
representing the post-normative cosmopolitan project. He says, “Literature communicates 
directly with this force because of its peculiar ontological status. As something that is 
structurally detached from its putative origin and that permits and even solicits an infinite 
number of interpretations, literature is an exemplary modality of the undecidability that opens a 
world” (35). Here, Cheah is talking about world literature more broadly, but I think the same 
could be said of Ozeki’s A Tale for the Time Being particularly because of its unique formal 
aspects as discussed previously. 
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cosmopolitanism shifts to encapsulate the entire universe. The novel seems to advocate for a 
shift from cosmopolitanism to planetarity.23 However, Ozeki seems resistant to giving up the 
idea of cosmopolitanism altogether. A reason for this persistence might be because planetarity as 
a concept may either bring together the human and the nonhuman or push them apart, while 
Ozeki views posthuman cosmopolitanism as undertaking the former only. Although the temporal 
mode of cosmopolitanism manages to negotiate the non-dialectical epistemological relationships 
of the posthuman world, it also appears to struggle with representing the wide-ranging 
cosmopolitan subject in Tale. 
Due to the ontological implications associated with the distortion of time in Tale, 
temporal cosmopolitanism contributes new challenges to understanding reality. The novel begins 
by using the metafictional form to point to a cosmopolitan connection; however, this approach 
soon proves to be futile due to the distorted quality of literary time. Nao’s diary serves as a sort 
of halfway point between reality and imagination, which is the kind of cosmopolitan outlook that 
Ozeki seems to favor. Nao comments on her writing process, saying, “When I sit down to write, 
[the words] slip away and become unreal again. The past is weird. I mean, does it really exist? It 
feels like it exists, but where is it? And if it did exist but doesn’t now, then where did it 
go?...Maybe that Nao of the past never really existed, except in the imagination of this Nao of 
                                                 
23 Planetarity refers to a more ecological way of looking at the planet as opposed to a 
globalized framework. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak says, “The planet is in the species of alterity, 
belonging to another system; and yet we inhabit it, on loan….If we imagine ourselves as 
planetary creatures rather than global entities, alterity remains underived from us; it is not our 
dialectical negation, it contains us as much as it flings us away” (72-73). 
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the present” (97). Nao self-reflexively tries to understand her past self through writing, but she 
makes the mistake of linking the words in her diary to ontology, expecting the two to match up. 
However, as she notes, the boundary between reality and imagination is slim and writing is 
especially representative of this dilemma since literary time differs from real time. When you 
write, “you’re always stuck in the then and you can never catch up to what’s happening now, 
which means that now is pretty much doomed to extinction” (98). Nao’s metafictional reference 
to literary time draws attention to the limitations of temporality within the space of her diary, 
while also highlighting Ozeki’s own novelistic process, thus creating a literary cosmopolitan 
connection between the two writers. 
However, the significance of literary time also points to Nao’s identity, owing to the 
similarity between her name and the word “now,” which makes her resemble time itself and 
appear more than human. Nao is a product of the limitations of literary time as she exists both as 
her real self as well as her diary representation; the two cannot be merged into one. Nao’s two 
selves exist as separate entities which cannot be connected through literature and therefore, 
literature fails to unite the different aspects of the literary cosmopolitan identity. In the diary, 
Nao’s last words are, “The fact is, I’m all alone...I don’t believe I exist, and soon I won’t. I am a 
time being about to expire...Maybe I’m invisible. I guess this is it. This is what now feels like” 
(340-41). At this moment, Nao’s perceptual reality and her literary imagination collide, but this 
temporal implosion is somehow ontologically evident in the physical diary that Ruth holds in her 
hands, years later and an ocean away. The temporal limit of literature is transcended by the 
cosmopolitan space created by the posthuman aspects of the novel.   
The temporal distortion of posthuman cosmopolitanism transcends the literary space of 
the diary and begins to seep into Nao’s life as well. She says, “When I was a little kid in 
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Sunnyvale, I became obsessed with the word now. My mom and dad spoke Japanese at home, 
but everyone else spoke English, and sometimes I would get caught in between the two 
languages. When that happened, everyday words and their meanings suddenly became 
disconnected, and the world became strange and unreal” (98). Nao’s childhood struggle to place 
herself in the world due to the disparity between her two languages and in the interstices of her 
own name results in her adolescent liminality. Drawing upon her own name, she says, “saying 
now obliterates its meaning, turning it into exactly what it isn’t...Catching it destroys it, and I felt 
like I was disappearing too” (99). Through the process of speaking and writing, Nao realizes the 
temporal fragility of the word “now” as well as her of own self when considered from a bigger 
cosmopolitan framework of feeling lost in the world. Nao’s lost, cosmopolitan nomadism is a 
result of a shift from a normative to a post-normative take on her own self. As Nao realizes the 
indefinable nature of the cosmopolitan subject because of the multitude of identities formed 
through time, her dissonance from reality grows stronger. At one point, she says, “I was unreal 
and my life was unreal, and Sunnyvale, which was real, was a jillion miles away in time and 
space,” while Ruth also agrees, saying that her “life in New York still felt so vivid and real. Like 
Nao’s Sunnyvale” (79; 95). By highlighting the felt sense of reality that Ruth and Nao feel about 
distant places occupied in the past, their current sense of reality diminishes with regards to their 
present posthuman selves. The novel suggests that cosmopolitan realness is in fact, just a product 
of the past and of the imagination, and does not have a place in the posthuman world.  
In the posthuman state of the world in Tale, the very understanding of a temporally 
present reality gets overturned as it is instead used to refer to a sort of cosmopolitan possibility, 
rather than concrete reality. When Ruth tries to corroborate Nao’s stories with factual evidence 
on the Internet, she is desperate to find out whether Nao is truly real. She says, “she felt like 
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she’d been trying to suck the girl out of the flowing screen with the sheer force of her will and 
the fixity of her eyeballs. Why did it matter so much? But it did. She needed to know if Nao was 
dead or alive. She was searching for a body” (115). Ruth’s desire for perceptual evidence of 
Nao’s existence speaks to the nomad’s quest for concreteness within the cosmopolitan project. 
However, the nomad’s constantly shifting subjectivity and lack of hierarchical frameworks in the 
posthuman condition results in a rejection of a concrete understanding of reality.24 Ruth too starts 
to give up her prior desire for perceptual truth while exploring the possibilities of quantum 
theory. Ruth says, “On a subatomic level, a single particle can exist as an array of possibilities, in 
many places at once…Nao would have liked that…If she were a subatomic particle, she could 
live here and in New York” (397).25 The subatomic particle is likened to a cosmopolitan 
individual occupying many different places at once, and the distortion of time distorts the 
ontological understanding of the cosmopolitan subject as well. 
Although time seems to make possible a posthuman mode of cosmopolitanism, the 
distortion of temporality also makes it difficult to cultivate posthuman cosmopolitan subjectivity 
                                                 
24 By a concrete understanding of reality, I specifically mean a reality consisting of 
hegemonic power structures already in place. 
25 Ruth’s husband Oliver talks about the specifics of Hugh Everett’s theory of multiple 
worlds, which destroys the idea of one single reality or perspective. He says, “Multiple outcomes 
imply multiple worlds” (Ozeki 395). So, in the case of the Schrodinger’s cat experiment (a cat is 
put into a box and no one knows whether he is dead or alive until you peek inside), there are two 
worlds created - “a dead-cat world and an alive-cat world” (398). Merely the possibility of an 
alternate outcome forms a sort of reality in itself. 
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ontologically. Nao struggles with the ambiguity of reality, both in her own life as well as in her 
literary representations, where the ambiguity arises due to the different narrative layers in this 
novel. Nao’s ultimate goal with the diary is to attain a certain sense of tangibility, something that 
the cosmopolitan nomad lacks, and to impart this tangible affect to the reader. She says, “I want 
to leave something real behind. But what can I write about that’s real?” (22). The novel links the 
cosmopolitan perspective with the limitations of language, both of which have a hard time 
proving their ontological existences. Tale starts off by referring to itself as just a fictional idea, in 
a metafictional move, saying “Or maybe none of these things will happen except in my mind and 
yours, because, like I told you, together, we’re making magic, at least for the time being” (5). 
The novel seems to embrace the imaginative possibilities of literature and cosmopolitanism at 
first. Nao and Ruth’s worlds collide precisely because of this ability to imagine a world where 
the corners of their worlds meet, engendering an imaginative cosmopolitanism. However, at the 
end of the novel, Ruth turns away from the imaginative possibilities of a cosmopolitan optic and 
says, “I don’t care about other worlds. I care about this one. I care whether she’s dead or alive in 
this world...This watch is real. Listen. It’s ticking. It’s telling me the time” (400). Ruth rejects the 
notion of temporal possibilities by moving toward a materialist notion of the world, which seems 
to bring the novel back to the idea of a normative cosmopolitanism.  
Although time appears to be the solution to the dilemma of posthuman cosmopolitanism, 
it also raises a new set of problems for the cosmopolitan subject. For instance, the unbounded 
and uncontrollable nature of time seems to eradicate any kind of ethics and politics for the 
posthuman cosmopolitan subject since reality becomes difficult to pinpoint. As Ruth 
contemplates Nao’s existence in the world after reading the diary, she says, “In the earthquake 
and the tsunami, 15,854 people died, but thousands more simply vanished, buried alive or sucked 
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back out to sea by the outflow of the wave. Their bodies were never found. Nobody would ever 
know what happened to them” (400). In this scene, the death and decay caused by the ocean 
waves and time itself cannot be reversed, therefore eradicating any cosmopolitan ideals that Ruth 
initially had. As the ocean waves immerse thousands of human beings within its depths, Ozeki 
makes it clear that posthuman cosmopolitanism can in fact eliminate the human altogether, in 
which case any kind of ethics and politics becomes unnecessary. In this sense, time does not 
serve as a solution to Ozeki’s original question dealing with the normative nature of 
cosmopolitanism. If those norms completely fall away, then ethics and politics disappear too and 
the cosmopolitan subject becomes just an imaginary possibility in the world, much like the 
quantum particle. Therefore, even as Ozeki calls the cosmopolitan subject “a time being,” she 
also attempts to give it materiality through affect, or the cosmopolitan connection itself. Affect 
helps to deal with the challenges to reality posed by a temporal mode of cosmopolitanism. In 
turn, affect makes possible new ethical and political frameworks for the posthuman cosmopolitan 
subject.  
The lost and nomadic quality of posthuman cosmopolitanism is alleviated through the 
materiality of posthuman affect, wherein time also serves as the medium for affect. Ruth finds 
herself at odds with her own self, when she explains the contradictory meanings of her name - 
“In Japanese, Ruth is either pronounced rutsu, meaning “roots,” or rusu meaning “not at home” 
or “absent”” (59). Simultaneously rooted and absent, Ruth becomes a migratory figure, stuck in 
the liminal space of home and non-belonging forever. She finds herself embodying a posthuman 
liminality in her dreams - “Not a place, but a feeling of nonbeing, sudden, dark, and 
prehuman...No hands, no face, no eyes, no glasses, no Ruth at all. Nothing but a vast and empty 
ruthlessness…an eternal sense of merging and dissolving into something unnamable that went on 
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and on in all directions, forever” (122). Ruth’s struggle to locate herself is a result of the 
posthuman state of the world as well as her cosmopolitan nature. However, affect solves this 
problem by materializing the connection between the human and the nonhuman. Ruth’s terror is 
soon “replaced by a sense of utter calm and wellbeing...It was like being cradled in the arms of 
time itself” (123). Therefore, Ruth’s initial discomfort with being a posthuman disembodied self 
gradually shifts to a sense of comfort due to the material and maternal role played by time. The 
destructive connotations usually associated with time give way to a sense of permanence as Ruth 
says, “she stayed suspended in this blissful state for an eternity or two” (123). The embodiment 
of material and immaterial elements in the dream is reversed as Ruth is the one who is 
disembodied while time is embodied and is represented with arms. This strange role reversal 
creates a sense of the posthuman world as blurring the binary between the material and the 
immaterial, while creating an affective connection between the human and the nonhuman at the 
same time.  
Thus, affect causes a new kind of cosmopolitan worlding to take place. Claire Colebrook 
says, “Above and beyond physical and political borders there might be affective or immaterial 
communities… a space of infinite hospitality without limit, a city of refuge that occupies a 
virtual space, a community that is not grounded upon a common soil or even a normative notion 
of the citizen” (167). She uses the immateriality generated from affect to create a new kind of 
cosmopolitanism, one that adheres to immaterial as well as material elements of the world.26 
                                                 
26 Colebrook argues that the old approach to cosmopolitanism relies heavily on 
materiality - “Traditionally the cosmos signifies an orderliness, suggesting that the actual globe 
as material entity is placed within or expressive of a broader harmony (a cosmos of the planets 
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Colebrook argues, “In new forms of cosmopolitanism such appeals to divine or eternal harmony 
give way to an imaginative supplement: whatever the world is here and now, with all its global 
networks, markets and power structures, there can also be the figuration of ethical territories” 
(167).27 Thus, the affective and imaginative worlds created are directly associated with a shift in 
ethics, pointing to a new kind of cosmopolitanism - affective cosmopolitanism.28 I will use the 
term affective cosmopolitanism to look more closely at the new kind of cosmopolitanism that 
                                                 
and heavens)” (167). However, Colebrook goes against this notion to suggest that immateriality 
also has a place within cosmopolitanism today. 
27 It is interesting to note that Colebrook still believes in norms within cosmopolitanism 
as she says, “I maintain certain norms and values – this gives me the individual identity that 
allows me to be a moral individual. Yet, on the other hand, I am aware that those values are 
provisional, culturally and historically specific and never fully universalizable” (177). Although 
she tries to advocate a post-normative ethical positioning, she does not truly believe that such a 
position exists as “the cosmos is always an extension of the composed polity, an abstraction or 
idealization of man englobed in his world of human others” (178). 
28 Melissa Gregg and Gregory Seigworth also agree with the link between 
cosmopolitanism and affect, saying “Affect marks a body’s belonging to a world of encounters 
or; a world’s belonging to a body of encounters but also, in non-belonging, through all those far 
sadder (de) compositions of mutual in-compossibilites” (2). The idea of belonging or a lack of it 
is essential to the cosmopolitan project and its origins in affect hint at the possibility of an 
affective model of cosmopolitanism. 
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Ozeki’s novel constructs.29 Affective cosmopolitanism is a foray into the space between 
perception and possibility, to attempt to reveal the kinds of cosmopolitanism that can be made 
possible in the world through affect, but simultaneously keeping in mind the perceptual limits, 
which time often ignores. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Leela Gandhi defines affective cosmopolitanism as “the ethico-political practice of a 
desiring self inexorably drawn toward difference,” which means that people’s “affective 
intensities are equally liberated toward strangers as to kin” (17). Therefore, an affective 
community, in the broadest sense, points to a cosmopolitan approach within itself. However, the 
non-dialectical nature of affect makes it difficult to even quantify what is “difference,” by 
Gandhi’s definition, and what is not. 
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An Affective Mode of Cosmopolitanism 
Ozeki’s novel turns to the model of affective cosmopolitanism to deal with the lack of 
ethics and politics that a temporal mode of cosmopolitanism creates in the posthuman world. 
Often times, posthuman cosmopolitanism can lead to feelings of isolation and nomadism for the 
human figure, and perhaps for the environmental elements as well. This sense of nomadism 
stems from the dissonance from reality that temporal cosmopolitanism causes. Thus, the 
posthuman world may in fact cause a greater binary between the human and the nonhuman, 
isolating the two within the larger cosmopolitan framework. However, affect is the nebulous 
resonance between people and things that brings back cosmopolitanism’s ethical and political 
methodologies, without becoming normative.30 An earlier understanding of affect, which 
                                                 
30 Although affect has no singular definition or theory that defines it, it is a way to make 
sense of the non-dialectical and new materialist nature of the world. Like posthumanism, affect 
theories vary vastly. While some approaches look into phenomenologies of embodiment in 
human/nonhuman nature, others try to blur the affective line between living and nonliving 
technologies (Gregg and Seigworth 6-8). Still others link movements of matter with 
incorporeality or use it to resist normativity and are used in feminist and political theory (6-8). 
Affect can also be a mode of psychoanalytic inquiry to look at intersubjective and interobjective 
systems of social desiring, or an aspect of postcolonial discourse that considers emotions as 
affectual qualities without requiring subject and object positions (6-8). Thus, affect can serve a 
number of different functions and “affect theory is, at one level, an “inventory of shimmers” 
while, upon another register, it is a matter of affectual composition...as an ontology always 
coming to formation” (11). 
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sometimes carries on till today, is that affect refers to emotions that are expressed and reflected 
by human beings, in a kind of feedback loop (Sedgwick 12). Drawing on Eve Sedgwick’s 
understanding of affect, affect is said to add a texture to the social world that is mixed into our 
social experiences. However, these earlier views tie affect specifically to the human world. 
Although Tale showcases human affect, it also turns away from this traditional affective model 
to perceive posthuman affect as a way to solve the dilemma of posthuman cosmopolitanism and 
materialize the cosmopolitan connection in the novel. Affect transcends the realm of social 
human relations to occupy the larger environment within this novel through both literary and 
environmental spaces. Current scholars define affect as being “found in those intensities that pass 
body to body (human, nonhuman, part-body, and otherwise), in those resonances that circulate 
about, between, and sometimes stick to bodies and worlds, and in the very passages or variations 
between these intensities and resonances themselves” (Gregg and Seigworth 1). Furthermore, 
affect becomes a material entity in itself, which helps to diminish the isolated nomadism and 
ontological challenges to reality that cosmopolitan subjects struggle with in a posthuman world. 
Instead, they can now turn to affect for a sense of cosmopolitan connection without necessarily 
locating this affect within a particular space or time or even body. Although the novel mainly 
takes on affective cosmopolitanism’s ethical repercussions, the politics of the project is also 
hinted at briefly. In Tale, Ozeki redefines the concept of cosmopolitanism in the posthuman 
world and locates the ethics and politics of the cosmopolitan subject within an affective realm, 
not bound to either the human or the environment but to the space in between.  
However, not all forms of affect maintain the nondialectical relationships that Ozeki is 
striving for in her novel. Nao attempts to move away from a human model of affect, but takes on 
a different approach, one of disembodiment, which worsens the isolation and sense of unreality 
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of the cosmopolitan subject. Upon her move to Japan, her classmates often bully her owing to 
her linguistic and cultural differences. Initially, she opts for a posthuman disembodiment in order 
to cope with her pain and her lack of agency becomes her superpower, as she says: 
Jiko was helping me cultivate my supapawa! by encouraging me to sit zazen for 
many hours without moving, and showing me how not to kill anything, not even 
the mosquitos that buzzed around my face…I learned not to swat them even when 
they bit me and also not to scratch the itch that followed…And soon there was no 
difference between me and the mosquitos. My skin was no longer a wall that 
separated us, and my blood was their blood. (Ozeki 204) 
By making this lack of agency her agential strategy, Nao becomes one with all living beings 
including mosquitos, thus achieving the nonunitary subject status that she desires. However, with 
this shift from unitariness to immateriality, her suffering also becomes equally immaterial and 
gets lost within the posthuman framework of the world. The “my blood was their blood” strategy 
might work for the human-nonhuman relationship because the suffering is devoid of power 
relations between the human and the nonhuman. However, this strategy does not seem to be 
successful for the human-human relationship because of the hierarchical relations involved 
which distort the humanist outlook. This disembodiment makes Nao feel lost and isolated 
because of her already liminal cosmopolitan subjectivity. 
The immateriality of suffering becomes a form of dehumanizing the human cosmopolitan 
subject based on the idea of difference, which takes away from the posthuman ethics of equality. 
When Nao’s classmates decide to film a video while assaulting her, Nao says, “I just lay there, 
perfectly still. It was pointless to struggle or scream…They could break my body but they 
wouldn’t break my spirit...I summoned up my supapawa, and soon the shadows were just 
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mosquitos, buzzing in the distance and bothersome only if you let them be” (277). Nao’s 
posthuman superpower is her lack of agency and her ability to make her suffering immaterial 
like mosquitos buzzing in the distance. However, this immaterial suffering, which was formerly 
a coping mechanism, starts to threaten her survival. Nao attains a state of disembodiment, where 
she not only moves away from affect but also from her body, instead restricting herself to a small 
space within her mind. When Nao gets ignored at school by her classmates and teacher, she says, 
“My voice stopped working then. No matter how hard I tried, I couldn’t force any sound to come 
out...I was unreal and my life was unreal” (77-79). As the disembodiment and lack of agency 
aggravates, Nao’s dissonance from reality and affect increases, fueled by the immanence of 
suffering. Nao truly becomes a posthuman subject in this instance because of this ability to make 
herself completely insignificant; however, this insignificance does not apply to all human 
subjects collectively, just her. Therefore, affect from a disembodied stance fails to solve the 
problem of the cosmopolitan subject – the isolation and ontological challenges to reality. In fact, 
this kind of affect worsens the plight of the human figure in a posthuman world, creating an even 
more normative and restrictive form of ethics and politics than before. 
Nao soon realizes that disembodiment fails to solve the problem of human suffering 
because the immateriality becomes a way of reinforcing power relations rather than eliminating 
them; therefore, she looks toward posthuman affect to reclaim agency. When the man from the 
French maid cafe tries to rape her, she goes “to the silent frozen place” in her mind “that was 
clean and cold and very far away” (335); however, ultimately, she brings herself back from her 
disembodied self to fight back and reclaim agency in time to find out that Jiko is dying and she 
must travel all the way to Jiko’s temple to bid farewell to her beloved great-grandmother. Nao’s 
reclamation of agency may seem to be contradictory to the posthuman framework of the novel; 
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however, it speaks to the significance of materializing affect in a space that is neither completely 
human nor completely posthuman. When Nao reclaims her agency in front of her classmates, she 
lets out a fierce cry: 
The supapawa of my bald and shining head radiated through the classroom…a 
bright bulb, a beacon, beaming light into every crack of darkness on the earth and 
blinding all my enemies. I put my fists on my hips and watched them tremble, 
holding up their arms to shield their eyes from my unbearable brightness. I 
opened my mouth and a piercing cry broke from my throat like an eagle, shaking 
the earth and penetrating into every corner of the universe. I watched my 
classmates press their hands over their ears, and saw the blood run through their 
fingers as their eardrums shattered. (288) 
This hyperbolic imagery suggests that Nao gains power over her classmates through her singular 
act of agency in the novel. However, this agency does not come from human will, but rather 
from affect, as Nao says, “a piercing cry broke from my throat” (288), where there is an absence 
of bodily agency. Her eagle-like cry pierces the ends of the earth and hints at affective agency as 
a form of agency that is both human and nonhuman in its expression. Although Nao does show 
off her bald head and cry out, at the end of the day, all she does is passively watch her 
classmates’ reactions, as indicated by the passive verbs, “watched” and “saw,” instead of taking 
any sort of direct action. Nao’s cry and its violent imaginary effects signify a move away from 
physical agency to the affective power of her grief through that nonhuman cry. The cry brings 
Nao’s suffering out of its current status of immateriality. Affect, just like in other instances 
throughout the novel, becomes a material thing in itself that moves past questions of agency and 
non-agency to occupy substantial space in the world as a posthuman creation. This posthuman 
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affect does not take away from the human’s suffering, and also maintains an active relationship 
with nonhuman agency. Rather than being an expression of only human affect or nonhuman 
affect, posthuman affect expresses both Nao’s grief as well as that of the imaginary eagle in this 
scene. In this sense, Nao’s posthuman affect helps to delineate a clearer sense of the ethics and 
politics of the posthuman cosmopolitan subject, which involves a bothness rather than a struggle 
between the human and the nonhuman worlds.  
In Tale, affect takes the material form of the environment like the eagle’s cry above as 
well as the literary form itself due to the human’s ontological dissonance from reality as 
discussed in the previous section. As both an aesthetic and ideological tool, affect moves the 
novel forward both formally and content-wise, where literature and nature act as the two 
affective media in Tale bringing back ethics and politics to forgotten groups in the world. As 
Ruth watches footage from the 2011 earthquake and tsunami in Japan, she compares the lost 
stories of suffering to a gyre, saying “The tidal wave, observed, collapses into tiny particles, each 
one containing a story…Like plastic confetti, they’re drawn into the gyre’s becalmed center, the 
garbage patch of history and time. The gyre’s memory is all the stuff we’ve forgotten” (114). 
The tsunami and the Internet turn into a human gyre of stories, where people’s stories are lost 
within. Ruth assumes Nao’s story to be just one of them, although she turns out not to be a 
victim of the tsunami. However, the novel’s multiple metafictional moves and literary worlds 
bring to light the resonances of lingering affect from generation to generation even in different 
times and worlds. In fact, the literary form is able to transmit affect in a way that goes beyond 
mere representation or connection, but instead the literary worlding creates a swirling and 
increasing accumulation of affects which highlight both human and nonhuman tales of injustice. 
Ruth mentions the practice of killing whales to obtain blubber in the nineteenth century and says, 
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“Whales are time beings…Creatures who survive and live that long presumably have long 
memories…The locals get excited. But mostly the whales still stay away from Whaletown, 
leaving only their names behind” (58). The ocean waves further the accumulation of past and 
present affect by serving as the medium through which the stories are passed on. Therefore, 
literature and nature not only function as channels for expanding affect, but as affective modes of 
being themselves, broadening the normative notions of ethics and politics in cosmopolitanism. 
Affective cosmopolitanism in Tale is also brought out through the material elements of 
natural migration that seep through the novel into human and nonhuman lives, emphasizing the 
preexisting cosmopolitan nature of the environment. When Ruth first moves to the island, her 
surroundings are rife with plant and animal species from various parts of the world. Ruth’s 
European climbing roses and Oliver’s bamboo grow together in harmony covering up the outer 
walls of the house, while Miyagi oyster shells litter the island’s beaches (60; 187). This natural 
cosmopolitanism makes Ruth feel “the wide Pacific ocean shrink just a little” (187). As isolated 
as the island seems, it incorporates people and plants and things from all parts of the world, 
suggesting that nature is already a cosmopolitan entity. However, the cosmopolitan nature of the 
plants appears to hinder human existence as Ruth says, “The two species quickly grew up into a 
densely tangled thicket, so that soon it was almost impossible to find the entrance to the house if 
you didn’t already know where it was. The house seemed in danger of disappearing” (60). As the 
materiality of natural cosmopolitanism becomes more prominent, it overshadows the human 
being’s minute existence corresponding with the posthuman state of the world. The threat of the 
immaterial nonhuman world overshadowing the human remains a crucial problem in posthuman 
cosmopolitanism. 
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However, affective cosmopolitanism negotiates this issue through posthuman affect 
which allows for a coexistence of both the human and the nonhuman in the world, without a 
hierarchical system in place. The materiality and agency of the ocean waves throughout Tale 
speak to the affective nature of natural cosmopolitanism as it bridges the gap between the human 
and the nonhuman. When Ruth wonders about Nao’s existence, she says, “Was the girl out there 
somewhere in all that water, her body decomposed by now, redistributed by the waves?” (30). 
Although she paints a rather morbid scene, Ruth points to the cosmopolitan nature of the waves 
which moves beyond merely being a natural cosmopolitan entity in the world, but also ensures 
the human’s cosmopolitanism through the image of redistribution of Nao’s body throughout the 
world because of the waves. Although the human is dead in this scene, Ozeki tries to perceive a 
different way of visualizing the human’s position in the world. In fact, Nao even calls herself a 
“ronin,” which means “a samurai warrior who doesn’t have a master,” or as she describes 
herself, “a little wave person, floating around on the stormy sea of life” (41; 42). By bringing the 
terms “wave” and “person” together, Nao creates a new posthuman being, one that is both a 
combination of the human and nonhuman, at least figuratively. This material and resilient 
connection between human Nao and the nonhuman waves is maintained through the medium of 
Nao’s diary and diminishes any prior hierarchies existent in the world.  
Therefore, Ozeki’s “time being” does not just connote living in a posthuman 
cosmopolitan world, but also points to the affective resonances between time beings because we 
all live in time collectively. Nao says, “And it occurred to me that the big old tree is a time being, 
and Jiko is a time being too...and I started to think about how words and stories are time beings” 
(24). Time not only gains agency by being a significant part of everything in the world, but also 
serves an affective function, drawing people and words and trees together. Through this shared 
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affect, time becomes an affective force in all their lives, both epistemologically and materially, 
although it remains an immaterial thing. Ruth tries to grasp at time’s affective nature, saying, 
“What had those long moments felt like to [Nao]? It was hard to get a sense from the diary of the 
texture of time passing. No writer, even the most proficient, could re-enact in words the flow of a 
life lived” (64). By attempting to feel the texture of time itself, Ruth minimizes human agency in 
the form of the novel and views time as an agential and affective element that goes beyond its 
linear epistemological function, creating narrative shifts in people’s lives. In fact, the novel plays 
with this idea of posthuman affect by showing increasing evidence of affect that generates from 
the environment and time itself. Ozeki separates human agency from affect in order to create 
new kinds of ethics and politics for a posthuman cosmopolitan world, separated from the 
normative structures already in place. 
In fact, literary affect is one of the main ways the characters in the novel make sense of 
ethical decisions. As Haruki realizes the sense of unreality associated with human knowledge, he 
starts to depend on the literary form to help him understand the affective nature of his decisions. 
Haruki writes in his diary, ““Tomorrow I will die in battle,” said Captain Crow. Montaigne wrote 
that death itself is nothing. It is only the fear of death that makes death seem important. Am I 
afraid? Certainly, and yet… “Que sais-je?” Montaigne asked. The answer is nothing. In reality, I 
know nothing. And yet, at night I lie on my bed, counting my beads, one for every thing on earth 
I love, on and on, in a circle without end” (326). Human affects such as fear and love are 
meaningless in a way, because of the utter ignorance of the human being. Although he lists the 
things he loves again and again, Haruki really has only his impending death to live for. However, 
by choosing to write down his affective experiences, they become material and he says in the 
freedom of death, he will “look forward at last to being fully aware and alive” (324). There 
Ghosh 50 
seems to be a strange dichotomy between Haruki’s feeling of “being fully aware and alive” and 
his death; however, the same dichotomy reappears when Jiko’s last words on her deathbed turn 
out to be “To live” (366). Jiko’s last words reflect Haruki’s last act of agency, both in their non-
duality as well as in their literary materiality, as they become literary affects materially changing 
Nao and Ruth’s lives for the better. Therefore, affect shifts from the human space to the written 
arena which makes the affective cosmopolitan connection materially present in the world. 
However, affect is traditionally not a material element of the world, and its immateriality 
is what causes it to be so undefinable.31 Ben Highmore says, “In common English usage the 
words designating affective experience sit awkwardly on the borders of the material and the 
immaterial, the physical and the metaphysical: we are moved by a sentiment; our feelings are 
hurt; I am touched by your presence” (120). But how does this disparity between the perceived 
immateriality of affect and its linguistic materiality relate to Ozeki’s novel? It is precisely 
because affect’s materiality is located within language, which is also immaterial, that affect 
becomes a sort of link between the material and the immaterial world in the novel. This point is 
especially relevant to Tale because of the existence of four concentric literary worlds within the 
space of the novel, which creates a tangible in-between location for the transmission of affect 
through time and space. However, it must be noted that this transmission of affect does not relate 
                                                 
31 Gregg and Seigworth say, “How to begin when, after all, there is no pure or somehow 
originary state for affect? Affect arises in the midst of in-between-ness: in the capacities to act 
and be acted upon” (1). Affect does not seem to have an origin, instead it originates from doing, 
or agency. 
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to empathy communicated between the reader and the writer, but rather the novel itself creates a 
staging ground for a cosmopolitan ethics and politics through literary affect. 
Affect is often expressed through the literary form within Tale, as depicted through Nao’s 
diary and her great-uncle kamikaze pilot Haruki #1’s attempt to pen down his thoughts during 
the Second World War. When the real readers read Ruth reading Nao reading Haruki #1’s letters 
and secret French diary, it creates three layers of metafiction in total and four literary worlds. 
However, these four concentric reader-writer circles do not translate literary affect in the same 
ways. The spaces between the four literary worlds pass down affect from Haruki #1 to Nao to 
Ruth to us, where I would assume that each time the characters’ affect gets watered down to a 
representation of a representation and so on. However, Ozeki’s novel suggests a different 
scenario. Nao’s journey through affect is one of grief and suffering. When the dot-com bubble 
bursts, Nao’s father loses his job in California and has to move back to Japan, where he remains 
lonely, unemployed and severely depressed. Nao also struggles to deal with the shift due to the 
linguistic and cultural barriers she encounters at school as well as her father’s multiple suicide 
attempts. However, she converts the immateriality of her grief into a material representation by 
writing in her diary, which is transmitted to Ruth even as she reads the diary in a different time 
and place. Ruth says, “The purple words were mostly in English, with some Japanese characters 
scattered here and there, but her eye wasn’t really taking in their meaning as much as a felt sense, 
murky and emotional, of the writer’s presence” (Ozeki 12). The words on the page appear to 
bring Nao’s grief to life and create a metafictional affective connection between Ruth and Nao. 
However, this literary linkage is not just the typical reader-writer connection. There is something 
more going on underneath the surface due to the multiple reader-writer worlds in the novel, 
which goes beyond connection and leads to a materiality of sorts. This material affect speaks to 
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the cosmopolitan goal of a transnational connection, but severs it from any sort of normative 
ethics and politics already in place. Instead, this affect leads to a space for creation of an ethics 
and politics, that stems from the resonances of contact, rather than from some global authority. 
Although it may seem as if the novel is committing the affective fallacy by suggesting 
that the reader-writer affective connection lies in the transmission of emotional feelings, the 
novel in fact, moves away from this very idea by hinting at affect’s impersonal quality. Of 
course, there is a sense of connection between the reader and the writer as with every novel; 
however, Ozeki’s novel moves beyond that superficial emotional pleasure that comes from 
reparative reading and instead looks at the impersonal affects between the various literary worlds 
created in the novel. Smith warns readers against the affective hypothesis and clarifies that 
personal feelings come under the realm of the affective hypothesis, while impersonal feelings do 
not conform to such a market model and “emphasize the unpredictability of affective 
connections” (2). By looking at literary affects as impersonal feelings, she views the link 
between aesthetics and feelings as destabilizing the relation between the emotional and the 
personal (11).32 Smith also talks about I.A. Richards and his philosophy that the affective 
response to an image is not linked to its representative content but to some other neurological 
relation, that produces a “readiness for this or that kind of behaviour in which we find ourselves 
                                                 
32 Smith locates these literary affects or impersonal feelings within the neoliberal moment 
specifically, but I am considering them within the posthuman moment in Ozeki’s novel. 
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after the experience” (13). By moving beyond representation, affect points to action instead.33 
Smith locates literary affect’s agency in the tone of a text, which is “a literary or cultural 
artifact’s…global or organizing affect, its general disposition or orientation toward its audience 
and the world” (Ngai 28). Sianne Ngai says tone cannot be located entirely in either subjective 
experience or specific objective features of a text; however, it is still easy to recognize because 
affect is so perceptibly immanent despite its immateriality (30).34 Thus, the aesthetic judgements 
that accompany the affective tone of a text function both aesthetically and ideologically (18). It is 
in this double functionality that affect engenders new kinds of ethics and politics in the world by 
focusing on the connection itself rather than the specific subject it originates from. 
Affect’s ethical implications become most evident when Haruki #1 battles with the 
question of literature itself and its relationship to affect. In a metafictional move, he draws two 
different representations of the link between literature and affect.35 On the one hand, he says in 
                                                 
33 Sigmund Freud argues that affect does not reflect or think; affect acts; however, 
“sensate tendrils” constantly extend between unconscious affect and conscious thought  (357-
59).  
34 Ngai uses the example of disgust to explain this idea of affect going beyond subjective 
and objective textual features - “For we can speak of a literary text whose global or organizing 
affect is disgust without this necessarily implying that the work represents or signifies disgust, or 
that it will disgust the reader. Exactly ‘where,’ then, is the disgust?” (30). 
35 This point is echoed by Rocío Davis as she considers Tale from the perspective of 
genre theory by focusing on the transits between fiction and autobiography in the novel. She 
elaborates upon Haruki’s diary and letters, saying, “Haruki’s two forms of life writing—the 
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the letters, “I find myself drawn to literature more now than in the past; not the individual works 
as much as the idea of literature – the heroic effort and nobility of our human desire to make 
beauty of our minds – which moves me to tears” (Ozeki 257). Haruki’s idea of literature as an 
aesthetic tool to depict humanist agency is nothing new, but this statement is a front that he puts 
up for the army inspectors who might see his letter. He turns away from this idealistic approach 
to literature as a humanist instrument, instead believing in its worthlessness. He says in his secret 
diary, “Silly. The amount of ink I waste on foolish outpourings, smashing clocks in my mind, 
crying out in my imagination. Forget the clock. It has no power over time, but words do, and 
now I am tempted to rip up these pages. Is this how I want to be remembered? By these words? 
By you?...I write them for my own benefit, to conjure you in my mind. They are meant only for 
me” (322-323). By moving away from the idea that literature offers a safe space for an emotional 
connection between the reader and the writer, the novel overturns the supposed assumptions of 
the affective fallacy. Instead, Haruki says that words put forth a space for conjuration or creating 
                                                 
letters and the diary—allow for ontological slippages facilitated by multiple inscriptions of the 
self” (Davis 96). However, she is more interested in the question of how writers represent reality 
in their fiction, which is a project that Ozeki undertakes in this novel through the way in which 
the protagonist Ruth is clearly based on her own self. Davis argues, “Writing the lives of others 
becomes a key operation for the characters in the novel: Nao and Ruth (and, to a degree, Haruki) 
struggle to write the stories of others, perhaps as a strategy for understanding themselves” (96-
97). Although this concern is a question that I certainly came across during my research, I see the 
materiality of affect as the reason behind the seemingly blurred lines between reality and fiction 
in this novel. 
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worlds, as he mentions in his final letter, “There are other words and other worlds, dear Mother” 
(258). Thus, the location of affect also shifts to this space of creation, rather than a space of 
connection. 
The ethical repercussions of literary affect in the world can be seen in Nao’s act of 
reading Haruki #1’s Second World War memoir, causing a monumental ethical shift in both her 
and her father’s life. Ruth is the one who finds Haruki’s diary lying amidst the washed-up drift 
and realizes the significance of that diary for all their lives. She says, “Nao must read this, and 
her father, too. They have to know the truth” (330). And so, Ruth leaves the diary in a safe place 
for Nao during one of her dream sequences. Nao ends up finding the diary right after Jiko says 
her last words and that diary brings both her and her father out of their depression, due to 
Haruki’s small but significant act of courage during his last moments. Therefore, Ruth’s single 
affective act creates a chain reaction, further affecting all the other characters in different worlds 
and spaces and times. However, the one question she asks herself is “It’s real, but how did it get 
here? How did it end up in the freezer bag and here in my hands?” (329). The sudden 
reappearance of Haruki’s diary on Ruth’s shoreline almost seems to portray an act from beyond 
the grave, but rather it is a clear materialization of literary affect itself, made possible by the 
ocean waves and crossing all the boundaries that have ever existed. As the literary reading 
process intermingles with environmental agency, an affective mode of cosmopolitanism becomes 
predominant in the novel which creates a deeply personal cosmopolitan connection between 
these time beings. The personal tone of the connection suggests that this project is more about 
the ethics than the politics of posthuman cosmopolitanism. 
Then, going back to the issue of the metafictional connection between Ruth and Nao, the 
question becomes more about the post-normative creation of the reader and the writer, rather 
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than the preexisting ethical connection between them. At one point, Ruth contemplates on this 
very concern, saying, “Surely a reader wasn’t capable of this bizarre kind of conjuration, pulling 
words from the void?...Who had conjured whom?...Was Nao the one writing her into being?” 
(392). The conjuration of literature and literary worlds creates a space for affect to exist in, but 
this affect is conceived within the literary just like the brand of posthuman cosmopolitanism that 
Ozeki favors. One of the first things Nao writes in the diary is “You wonder about me. I wonder 
about you” (3). Through the second-person point-of-view, the novel appears to link the reader 
and the writer in an affective connection; however, the act of wondering signifies a worlding 
move, rather than intimacy or connection.36 Nao says, “It feels like I’m reaching forward through 
time to touch you, and now that you’ve found it, you’re reaching back to touch me...It’s like a 
message in a bottle, cast out onto the ocean of time and space” (26). The message in the bottle 
refers to the affective resonances occupying the space between the multiple worlds in the novel. 
                                                 
36 Hsiu-chuan Lee considers the worlding within the novel as a cosmopolitical move as 
she examines the world-making potentials of minoritized individuals in Tale by focusing on the 
link between cosmopolitanism and fiction reading and writing. She argues, “In Tale, minor 
cosmopolitics derives force from the connection between Nao and Ruth as two marginalized 
figures” and fiction writing “is a cosmopolitan encounter that, according to Tale, bears vivid 
similarities in both process and consequences to the chance encounter between two particles in 
the quantum universe” (Lee 34; Lee 37). While Lee emphasizes the connections between 
cosmopolitanism and the creation of fiction, I see this link as being just a byproduct of affect’s 
materiality within the novel. Affect is the glue that joins these seemingly arbitrary concepts 
together owing to the resonances it leaves behind in between the real and the fictive worlds. 
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However, affect here is not just a signifier of the connection between the reader and the writer, 
but rather a space for creation of something beyond the reader-writer connection. This space for 
creation offers a space for new ethical frameworks, which stem from these affective resonances. 
In fact, the novel goes on to advocate a cosmopolitan ethics based on nonhuman agency 
in the current posthuman age. While working at a computer technology company in the Silicon 
Valley, Nao’s father tries to design a “weapon that will refuse to kill,” that would ultimately 
prevent human soldiers from losing their own ethical intuition (309). Nao’s father attempts to 
preempt human agency with technological agency in order to lessen the effects of the 
Anthropocene. If computer technology can make ethical decisions by itself, then human agency 
decreases and with it, human responsibility for their actions. Ozeki says, “He was trying to figure 
out if there was a way to build a conscience into the interface design that would assist the user by 
triggering his ethical sense of right and wrong and engaging his compulsion to do 
right…Needless to say, technology design is not value-neutral, and military contractors and 
developers do not want these kinds of questions raised, never mind built into their controllers” 
(308). By moving toward a posthuman mode of ethics through affect, Ozeki tries to universalize 
the ethical project of cosmopolitanism by expanding it to include the technology in the world 
today as well as the natural environment as mentioned earlier. From the affective cosmopolitan 
worldview, human beings, technology and the environment all have to equally take part in the 
affective project in order to approach ethics from the posthuman standpoint and move away from 
dialectical hierarchies. 
Within this larger ethical framework of nonhuman agency, politics becomes a fuzzy term 
to define; however, the novel locates politics in the post-normativity and anonymity of the 
posthuman era. Foucault makes the distinction between a disciplinary society that norms 
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individuals and a society of control that unravels the modern nation-state relation and leads to 
post-normativity through neoliberal governance (Cherniavsky, Neocitizenship: Political Culture 
After Democracy 17). Cherniavsky further expands on this prognosis, saying “governmentality 
after discipline is a grammar of environment, which abdicates (as no longer necessary or 
functional) the vast disciplinary project of normalizing the identifications, the grammar of 
incorporation and abjection, which constitute the psychic life of human subjects” (22). The post-
normative subject therefore exists in a society of control, forming “incomplete, susceptible 
subjects, perennially open to refinements – or “modulations” of control that now traverse the 
social field (23). As the environment and technology gain agency over ethical decisions in Tale, 
the cosmopolitan subject becomes imbricated in this post-normative subjectivity because agency 
shifts from the hands of the human to the nonhuman. Cherniavsky wonders, what are the 
political capacities of the neocitizen? (35).37 Ozeki also finds herself struggling with the same 
                                                 
37 In her book Neocitizenship: Political Culture After Democracy, Cherniavsky looks at 
neocitizenship through the lens of neoliberal governance, which is of course quite different from 
the posthuman cosmopolitan worldview I am considering. However, in many ways, the 
neoliberal and the posthuman approaches overlap. With the move from the public nation-state 
idea to private interest, there is a rejection of a national “way of life” (35). This rejection causes 
an elimination of the previous idea of reproduction of the state subject. Instead, the neocitizen no 
longer makes distinctions between the nation-state and other countries due to the emergence of 
individual entrepreneurial actors (Ong 14). Similarly, posthuman cosmopolitanism rejects the 
idea of the human as dominating all life and the cosmopolitan worldview as well. Instead, it 
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questions in the posthuman novel as the human is no longer in control of their own subjectivity 
and subsequently politics as well. 
Ozeki turns toward anonymity in the posthuman era to negotiate the obscure politics of 
the posthuman novel. Nao’s father creates an online security system to remove the videos of Nao 
being bullied from the Internet and to give her a fresh start. However, this technology also serves 
as a way of keeping people anonymous and eliminating their existence on the Internet. This 
move adds to the posthuman character of the world in the novel, as the human not only merges 
with the environment but also becomes nonexistent. Nao’s father says, “Naoko made up a funny 
theory of unbeing…She says anonymity is the new celebrity…freedom comes from being 
unknown” (Ozeki 383). The novel does not just advocate a posthuman epistemological shift, but 
perhaps a world where the human is in a state of epistemological nonbeing as a way to locate 
freedom. This shift in the way Ozeki perceives the politics of posthuman cosmopolitanism is 
particularly interesting considering Cherniavsky’s views about the post-normative nature of the 
society of control. In The Transparency Society, Byung-Chul Han adds that in the society of 
control, “compulsive transparency annihilates the fragrance of things, the fragrance of time” 
(32).38 Therefore, to maintain the fragrance of things and time, or affect, anonymity is the mode 
                                                 
moves toward a post-normative subjectivity and in fact, takes a step beyond Cherniavsky’s ideal 
to include nonhuman participants in that framework. 
38 Han further says, “The society of transparency not only lacks truth; it also lacks 
symbolic appearance. Neither truth nor symbolic appearance are see-through. Only emptiness is 
entity transparent. To avert this emptiness, a mass of information is brought into circulation. The 
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used in Tale. Han says “no community can form in the society of transparency” because of the 
information overload which turns the entire globe into a panopticon and freedom becomes a form 
of control (49). A cosmopolitan community can only survive through anonymous affective 
relations in the posthuman world, which again functions post-normatively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
mass of information and imagery offers fullness in which emptiness is still noticeable...the mass 
of information produces no truth” (40-41). 
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Conclusion 
Tale is situated in a posthuman world where the human being feels lost and vulnerable 
amidst the nonhuman elements. Nonhuman figures like the lone Jungle Crow and the ocean 
waves transcend their usual literary value and encompass a significant part of the posthuman 
literary imagination. These nonhuman elements not only form an essential part of the narrative 
but create and change it as well, thereby altering literature from a humanist to a posthumanist 
endeavor. Meanwhile, the cosmopolitan subjects in Tale use literature as a way to understand 
and further their sense of cosmopolitanism, the prime example being Ruth and Nao’s literary 
connection through the diary. The posthuman turn in the literary narrative shifts the nature of 
cosmopolitanism from a normative concept to a post-normative one as Nao looks at a temporal 
mode of cosmopolitanism through the idea of “the time being.” Tale promises the cosmopolitan 
subject a posthuman world to live in, but within this very promise lies the eternal difficulty of 
being a human subject while also decentering oneself. Tale’s struggle to define the cosmopolitan 
subject also stems from the ontological challenges to reality that come with the distortion of 
literary time. As the novel battles with the contradictions inherent within posthuman 
cosmopolitanism, the novel reconceives the ongoing tension between the human and the 
posthuman worlds through literary and environmental affect. While the text materializes the 
cosmopolitan connection through the multiple layers of metafiction, environmental affect 
complicates this materiality of connections by blurring the line between the material and the 
immaterial. Tale’s affective model of cosmopolitanism generates from its metafictional form as 
well as from its examination of agency with respect to affect, transcending the human and 
creating posthuman connections. 
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Affective cosmopolitanism helps to materialize the literary connection between the reader 
and the writer, and the human and the nonhuman, thereby effectively negotiating the problem of 
posthuman cosmopolitanism and raising the ethical and political stakes of the cosmopolitan 
project. Affective cosmopolitanism promotes a way of being that ensures that human 
cosmopolitanism can be posthuman as well. This project raises the stakes of the cosmopolitan 
project by making it ethically different from its previous conception. While humanist 
cosmopolitanism was primarily concerned with human subjectivity and the cosmopolitan 
connection between human beings, posthuman cosmopolitanism turns toward human as well as 
nonhuman entities in order to locate affective relations within the larger planet. Through 
affective cosmopolitanism, the human figure learns to take pride in its new position as a speck in 
the universe and nonhuman agency and anonymity become the new mode of ethics within 
posthuman cosmopolitanism. 
Thus, affective cosmopolitanism ensures that posthuman cosmopolitanism does not 
completely do away with ethics and politics, but instead still maintains these larger foundations 
through an affective positioning that moves away from existing beliefs. However, one of the 
limitations of affective cosmopolitanism is that the political project still falls short due to its 
undefined nature in Ozeki’s novel. Tale advocates a cosmopolitan ethics based on anonymous 
affective relations, but I wonder about the political implications of anonymity in the posthuman 
age. While humanist cosmopolitanism had a sole political project of transcending the nation-state 
to look at human rights and global democracy, its ethical requirements were equally stringent 
focusing on universal norms. Posthuman cosmopolitanism shatters the normative ethical and 
political framework of humanist cosmopolitanism and radicalizes the cosmopolitan project by 
suggesting a post-normative mode of ethics and politics beyond human personhood. The novel 
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suggests that anonymity becomes the new ethical mode of posthuman cosmopolitanism; 
however, a drawback to this approach is that anonymity might completely eradicate the political 
project or perhaps turn all politics into ethics. Ozeki does not delve deep into the political 
implications of posthuman cosmopolitanism, but rather gestures toward them. These questions 
could be a starting point for further research by looking at other novels or particular literary 
genres that turn to the posthuman form of the novel to engage with politics. 
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